Just as he challenged the dominant analytic–synthetic distinction, Quine also took aim at traditional normative epistemology. According to Quine, traditional epistemology tried to justify the sciences, but this effort (as exemplified by Rudolf Carnap) failed, and so we should replace traditional epistemology with an empirical study of what sensory inputs produce what theoretical outputs: [45] The Pantheon of Skeptics". CSI. Committee for Skeptical Inquiry. Archived from the original on January 31, 2017 . Retrieved April 30, 2017. All three set theories admit a universal class, but since they are free of any hierarchy of types, they have no need for a distinct universal class at each type level.

Quine, Willard Van Orman (1969). Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press. pp.82–83. ISBN 0-231-08357-2. Realism, now logicism, "Realism, as the word is used in connection with the mediaeval controversy over universals, is the Platonic doctrine that universals or abstract entities have being independently of the mind; the mind may discover them but cannot create them." Putnam, Hilary (March 1974). "The refutation of conventionalism". Noûs. 8 (1): 25–40. doi: 10.2307/2214643. JSTOR 2214643. Reprinted in Putnam, Hilary (1979). "Chapter 9: The refutation of conventionalism". Philosophical Papers; Volume 2: Mind, Language and Reality. Cambridge University Press. pp.153–191. ISBN 0521295513. Quote on p. 159. I will stop trying to summarize his arguments here, because I feel like I am already in over my head. I will say, however, that Quine’s argument against logical positivism seems to rely on his own presumptions about knowledge and the world—which may, after all, be quite reasonable, but this still does not make for a conclusive argument. In short, Quine may be arguing against the dogmas of logical empiricism with dogmas of his own. I often had this experience while reading Quine: at first I would disagree; but then, after formulating my disagreement, I would realize I was only begging the question, and that we were starting with very different assumptions.

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Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia Univ. Press. ISBN 0-231-08357-2. Contains chapters on ontological relativity, naturalized epistemology, and natural kinds.

Quine, Willard Van Orman; Hahn, Lewis Edwin (1986). The Philosophy of W.V. Quine. Open Court. p.6. ISBN 978-0812690101. In my third year of high school I walked often with my new Jamaican friends, Fred and Harold Cassidy, trying to convert them from their Episcopalian faith to atheism. Most of Quine's original work in formal logic from 1960 onwards was on variants of his predicate functor logic, one of several ways that have been proposed for doing logic without quantifiers. For a comprehensive treatment of predicate functor logic and its history, see Quine (1976). For an introduction, see ch.45 of his Methods of Logic. Let’s take a closer look at the Rogerian argumentative essay outline example below and notice the concessions for opposing points of view. A computer program whose output is its own source code is called a " quine" after Quine. This usage was introduced by Douglas Hofstadter in his 1979 book, Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid. Quine, W. V. (1961). From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-Philosophical Essays, Second Revised Edition. Harper torchbooks. Harvard University Press. p.22. ISBN 978-0-674-32351-3.Quine, W. V. (1961). From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-Philosophical Essays, Second Revised Edition. Harper torchbooks. Harvard University Press. pp.22–23, 28. ISBN 978-0-674-32351-3. How can we talk about Pegasus? To what does the word 'Pegasus' refer? If our answer is, 'Something', then we seem to believe in mystical entities; if our answer is, 'nothing', then we seem to talk about nothing and what sense can be made of this? Certainly when we said that Pegasus was a mythological winged horse we make sense, and moreover we speak the truth! If we speak the truth, this must be truth about something. So we cannot be speaking of nothing. Two Dogmas of Empiricism", The Philosophical Review 60: 20–43. Reprinted in his 1953 From a Logical Point of View. Harvard University Press.

Concepts in an unconceptualized reality are not more than language. Their purpose is pragmatic. The ultimate duty of language, science and philosophy is efficacy in communication and prediction. The philosophical issues treated in this book are very important indeed. In fact, they explain nothing less than what really exists in our universe and how mankind can deal with this universe through pragmatism (language). Clayton Littlejohn, John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 220. At Harvard, Quine helped supervise the Harvard graduate theses of, among others, David Lewis, Gilbert Harman, Dagfinn Føllesdal, Hao Wang, Hugues LeBlanc, Henry Hiz and George Myro. For the academic year 1964–1965, Quine was a fellow on the faculty in the Center for Advanced Studies at Wesleyan University. [21] In 1980 Shao M, Yang H (2012) Two kinds of multi-level formal concepts and its application for sets approximations. Int J Mach Learn Cybern. doi: 10.1007/s13042-012-0128-2From a Logical Point of View. Harvard Univ. Press. ISBN 0-674-32351-3. Contains " Two dogmas of Empiricism." Quine received an honorary doctorate from the Faculty of Humanities at Uppsala University, Sweden. [22] What is there?" is a simple way to put the ontological (study of being) question. But when two people disagree on the existence of something, we run into an ontological problem, stated by Quine as: "in any ontological dispute the proponent of the negative side suffers the disadvantage of not being able to admit that his opponent disagrees with him". If I say that there is a Pegasus, I can defend that notion by saying, "if there were no Pegasus, why are we able to talk about it?". I may eventaully submit and say that Pegasus is not a flesh and blood creature somewhere in the world, but rather an idea in men's minds." My opponent, however, is not claiming that Pegasus doesn't exist as an idea, but that it doesn't exist in the world as a flesh and blood creature. This volume of essays has a unity and bears throughout the imprint of Quine's powerful and original mind. It is written with the felicity in the choice of words which makes everything that Quine writes a pleasure to read, and which ranks him among the best contemporary writers on abstract subjects." ( Cambridge Review) Rudolf Fara (host), In conversation: W. V. Quine (7 videocassettes), Philosophy International, Centre for Philosophy of the Natural and Social Sciences, London School of Economics, 1994.